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INTRODUCTION
Concern about the environment played a role in the drafting of the original NAFTA
document  and  an  even  larger  role  in  its  ultimate  ratification,  as  evidenced  by  the
environmental  side accords.  The expressed  concerns stemmed  from a number of sources,
including:  the  dismal  environmental  performance  of the  Maquiladora  sector  along  the
Mexico-U.S.  border;  the  increasing  awareness  around  the  globe  of various  threats  to
environmental  integrity;  the  existence  of North-South  conflicts  regarding  the  role  of
environmental  safeguards  in  a  trading  context;  environmentalists'  frustration  with  the
treatment of environmental policies within the GATT; and fears that differential  standards
would affect relative competitiveness among producers in the three countries. Environmental
concerns had  also been raised in Canada during the debate which preceded the ratification
of the  Canada-U.S.  Trade  Agreement,  but  those  were  not  reflected  in  this  precursor
agreement and did not play as pivotal a role  as they did with the NAFTA.
This concern in the context of  North American trade liberalization  is in most respects
merely one expression of the heightened awareness within the global community. Trebilcock
and  Howse  (1995)  state  that  "The  relationship  between  international  trade  and  the
environment has only recently attained a prominent place on the trade agenda, although it has
been  a concern  of environmentalists  for some time"  (p. 331).
Agricultural  and agri-food production is inextricably  linked with the environment,
both as a generator of environmental problems and as bearer of the consequences of others'
environmental  transgressions. The interrelationship between agriculture and the environment
encompasses  many of the inputs, such as air, soil, water, fertilizers,  energy and pesticides.
Choices  among  possible  agricultural  production  methods  have  important  environmental
implications  and there  is  currently  considerable  variation  within  and  across  the  three
countries with respect  to environmental policies and their enforcement.94  Proceedings
The  broad  objective  of this  paper  is  to  take  an  analytical  view of the  potential
harmonization of environmental  policies pertaining to agriculture  within and across North
America.  Following a  brief review of the theoretical  and  applied  economic  literature,  we
provide an overview of existing environmental  institutional  arrangements within the three
countries  and within the NAFTA framework.  We then turn to a more detailed  look at the
livestock sector and  its associated environmental  polices  in Canada, the United States and
Mexico. We finish with some  concluding observations.
ANALYSIS  OF HARMONIZATION
Diversity and Scale
Socioeconomic  diversity is a relevant feature  within the Area and clearly plays  a role
in  harmonization  prospects.  At  the  same  time,  geographic  diversity  makes  its  own
contribution to the potential  for gains from freer trade and to the problems associated with
harmonization of environmental  policies. From the Arctic  north to the tropical south,  from
rainforests to deserts,  and from densely populated urban centers to uninhabited wilderness,
the geographic  region  encompassing  the  North  American  Free  Trade Area  (NAFTA)  is
characterized  by its  diversity.  Such variation  gives rise to the potential for freer trade in a
tremendous array of complementary  agricultural  and agri-food products as the provisions of
the Free Trade Agreement  come fully into force. Many of the restrictions  apt to remain for
the foreseeable  future can be seen to arise at least partially out of the geographically  diverse
conditions  faced by producers of similar products among the Area's growing regions.
It  is  sometimes  said  that  a person's  greatest  strength  is simultaneously  his or  her
greatest weakness.  This same principle  may well  apply to the NAFTA with regard to  its
vastness  and  diversity.  When  viewed  from  the  vantage  point  of agri-food  production
potential,  the size and variation contained within the region is  a tremendous advantage.  Yet
when viewed from the vantage point of harmonization of environmental policies,  it can  be
a distinct disadvantage.  The nature, form and magnitude of  the environmental problems faced
and  the set of desirable,  or even  feasible  solutions  are  geographically  and  economically
linked. Agriculture  and the agri-food complex inherently  span much of the geographic and
environmental  extent of the NAFTA.  Yet while convergence  to a single, all-encompassing
set of environmental  policies  boggles the  mind,  looking at the problem  of environmental
policies and outcomes  in a piecemeal  fashion can be fruitful.
In terms of policy harmonization,  convergence  and compatibility in the environmental
arena, there  are different  categories  of environmental  problems  which are  distinct in their
implications  for appropriate  responses. Distinctions  are made with respect to the geographic
scope  of the environmental  effects.  Such  distinctions  are  important  in  general  because
environmental  problems seem to be best addressed  at the most local level which is feasible.
A guiding principle  is to address global problems  globally and  local problems locally. This
is particularly relevant  for agriculture where producers of the same end product face different
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conditions with implications for the environmental  effects of their production. They also may
have quite different sets of feasible production process options  across geographic  regions.
Even  when  there  is  a  national  concern,  the  specific  manner  of  achieving  desirable
environmental  outcomes  is often left up to more local governing bodies.
One  set  of problems  is  those  which  are  essentially  global  in  nature,  such  as
atmospheric warming.  Policy guidelines to address such problems  are most appropriately
established on a global,  or at least multinational basis. As there are explicit agreements  or
accords signed  by many nations to address  at least  some of these issues  and the resulting
obligations  of individual nations  are  respected  under the  terms  of the NAFTA,  the  only
question remaining would be whether or not the NAFTA parties are pursuing  compatible
approaches and if not, whether the individual  countries'  approaches  should be made more
compatible.
At the next level are cases where undesirable  environmental  consequences  directly
cross the border into  the neighboring  country.  Canada,  Mexico  and the United  States are
particularly  vulnerable  given the length of the borders between  the neighboring countries
within  the  NAFTA.  Nowhere  is  it  more  apparent  for  agriculture  than  where  there  are
upstream-downstream  problems  with water availability and  quality.  Similar  to this  is the
situation where there  is a shared resource such as air or a body of water or a fishery, where
the actions of those on either side of the border affect the conditions  on the other.  Both of
these types of environmental and resource problems necessitate binational  policy solutions,
and  examples  of formal joint problem solving  both pre-date  and  are  included within  the
NAFTA.
Trade  economists and policy analysts may also be concerned  with apparently local
environmental  problems  and their regulation when trade liberalization  removes what  had
been a second best policy solution to an environmental problem or when trade increases lead
to  an  exacerbation  of  negative  environmental  outcomes.  Similarly,  the  imposition  of
environmental  regulations may have differing social welfare implications within and across
national boundaries under conditions  of restricted versus unrestricted  trade. It is this set of
issues for which the answers are the least clear cut in terms of harmonization and upon which
we focus the remainder of this paper.
Externalities and Indirect Spillovers
As economists we tend to pay attention to only those environmental concerns which
involve an extemality: when an action has consequences  beyond the immediate producer (or
consumer  in the case of consumption externalities')  which are not fully reflected in the price
or cost.  The first round effect on the environment can be considered to be a direct spillover.
1 Note  that  consumption  externalities  represent  another  way  for  apparently  local
environmental  effects  to  cross  borders,  and  policies  in  one  country  which  restrict  the  sale  or
consumption of goods having consumption externalities  can have an effect on the exporting country
through alteration of trade flows.
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The failure to include (as much of) the cost of the externalities for one set of producers when
they  are included  for another set gives  rise to  the competitiveness  concerns  expressed  by
some  industry  groups.  The  latter  can be  considered  to  be indirect  spillovers,  in  that the
externality itself does not cross the border, yet there are ripple effects. Removal of  tariffs  and
other trade barriers behind which the  more highly regulated  industries  had been operating
exacerbates  fears  of an  inability  to  compete.  Those  worried  about  competitiveness join
political  forces with those who care about environmental  outcomes in other countries even
when there are neither direct nor indirect spillover effects for the home country environment.
Together they  are able  to bring into the cross-national  political  arena issues which would
normally be only the province of more local authorities.
One case  for harmonization or compatibility of environmental  measures even when
the direct consequences  are  strictly local  is tied to the notion of pollution  havens.  Where
there is a discrepancy  in the stringency of policies or in their implementation,  it is possible
that pollution-intensive firms could be enticed to locate  in the more lenient country. Further,
the removal of barriers to trade in the resulting products could foster such actions  since the
production cost advantage (under lenient restrictions)  is no longer offset fully or partially by
the trade restriction. This relationship has been explored theoretically  by Krutilla (1991)  who
evaluated the potentially dual role of trade and environmental  policies. Responding to the
proposition  that  countries  enjoying  relatively  large  environmental  endowments  should
specialize in the production of environmentally intensive goods, Pethig (1976)  demonstrated
for a two-country, two-factor, two-good case the necessary and sufficient conditions  for this
to lead to a welfare loss. His assumption is that  at low levels of output there is no socially
significant  environmental  cost  whereas  at  some  high  level,  environmental  capacity  is
exceeded. Somewhere in between these two points, the environmental degradation may well
reduce welfare more than it is increased by the greater consumption of private goods due to
trade.  The  country importing  the environmentally  intensive  good always gains. Note that
these results presume a lack of environmental protection  in the exporting country.
The tradeoffs at work when one or more countries  impose environmental regulations
in  an open  economy  can be shown  in  a two country  partial equilibrium  model.  Table  1
reports the welfare  effects of regulations on a production externality.2 The analysis  assumes
that both countries are large in the  sense that changes  in domestic  supply and demand have
a world price effect. Such effects influence  the producer and consumer surplus results and
are shown in the first column of Table 1. Imposing the environmental regulation is presumed
to cause  private supply to  decrease (the  supply curve  shifts leftward).  Consider the  case
when both countries regulate.  The decrease in  supply from both countries  results in a higher
world price.  For the importing country the higher price adversely affects the terms of trade
and the opposite is true for an exporting country.  Focusing on market welfare, there are two
opposing effects  on producer welfare:  producer  surplus falls because  of the decrease  in
supply induced by the regulations  and increases as a result of the higher price.  The net effect
is indeterminate.  The higher price reduces  consumer welfare  in both countries.  Whether a
2 Krissoff et al. (1996)  clearly present the type of graphical model that underlies the signs of
the welfare changes  in Table  1.
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country  is  an importer or an exporter  partially  determines the net welfare effect.  For  an
importing country, consumer  interests dominate those of producers  and, irrespective of the
sign  of the  change  in  producer  welfare,  the  net market  effect  is negative.  In contrast,
producer  interests  dominate  the net welfare  change  for an exporting  country and  the  net
effect  is indeterminate.  The environmental  regulations have the intended positive effect on
non-market welfare. The net (market and non-market) welfare effect is indeterminate.
Table 1.  Market and Non-market  Effects from Regulation  of a Production Externality
Market Welfare
Policy change from no  Terms of  Non-market
regulations  Trade  PS*  CS*  Net  Welfare  Net Effect
Both Regulate
Importing country  - ?  - - +  ?
Exporting country  +  ?  - ?  +  ?
Importing Country Regulates
Importing country  - ?  - - +  ?
Exporting country  +  +  - +  - ?
Exporting Country Regulates
Importing country  - +  -
Exporting country  +  ?  - ?  +  ?
*PS=producer  surplus and CS=consumer surplus
Where  there are  divergent  regulations,  the effects  of one  country's  policies  have
indirect spillover effects  on the other country.  When only the importing country regulates,
its own net market welfare  falls, but non-market  benefits  are positive.  As  a result of the
regulation  indirect  spillovers  have  both market  and  non-market  effects  in  the exporting
country - production shifts to the exporting country with the associated market benefits and
increased  pollution.  When  only the  exporting  country  regulates,  the effect  on domestic
producers  is an  empirical  question,  but pollution  decreases.  The spillover  effects  cause
producer welfare to increase, but net market welfare falls.  The combination of lower market
welfare and more pollution lead to an overall reduction  in welfare.  While not shown in the
table, comparisons between one country regulating and both regulating are difficult to sign.
For example, when comparing producer surplus  in the importing country between the case
where both regulate  and the case where only the exporting country regulates,  the smaller
price effect when only the exporting country  decreases output has the opposite effect than
that due to  the importing  country  not restricting  output, so  the net effect  depends  on the
relative magnitudes of the gains and  losses.
A Case for Divergence
Before  making  a  case  for  divergence,  it  is  helpful  to clarify  what  is  meant  by
harmonization.  The nature of environmental  problems leads to two different definitions of
Lindsey and Bohman 9798  Proceedings
harmonization  based  alternatively  on  identical  environmental  outcomes  or  production
practices. The popular press and producer  group calls for harmonization have  in mind the
idea  of a  level playing  field  or equal  environmental  compliance  costs based  on  similar
production  practices.  Given the wide range  in  environmental  externalities from the  same
production  practices,  this  type  of harmonization  moves  in  the  opposite  direction  from
economic  efficiency  by  negating  any  comparative  advantage  given  by  environmental
assimilative capacity.3 Harmonization  of environmental  outcomes would result in outcomes
closer to the economically  efficient level and reflect the underlying comparative  advantage.
But this  approach does not take into account different social preferences  and priorities and
could  be  expected  to  exacerbate  differences  in the  costs of regulation.  It  also could  be
expected  to add  to problems  of regulatory  inefficiency,  since  regulation  and  monitoring
would be  called for regardless of its necessity  in terms of socially  optimal environmental
quality.  Upward  harmonization  of  outcomes  would  appear  to  require  monitoring  and
regulation everywhere  for that which is  in need of intervention anywhere within NAFTA.
Such  a policy is  consistent with neither equalization  of costs of regulation  nor regulatory
efficiency.
Whether  across-country  relocation of the  production of goods with environmental
consequences  makes sense or not is a function of  the arguments of the social welfare function
and their weights.  Diao and Roe (1996) developed a general equilibrium model (two-country,
two-factor,  two-good)  which  treated  pollution  as  a  function  of production  inputs.  The
production sectors differ in their factor intensity and factor immobility is assumed, with the
rich country ("North") having  a greater endowment of capital. Production  externalities are
treated  as  negative  arguments  in  the  consumer  utility  function,  and  the  authors  run  an
experiment which includes a harmonized  environmental policy (tax) and make comparisons
with the unregulated base case. They find that whether or not a country benefits  is related to
whether  or not it is large  enough to affect price, i.e., whether it is a large  or small country.
Under certain  sets of assumptions, harmonization of environmental  policies requires  income
transfers among  trading partners  to  avoid welfare transfers  from  the poorer to the  richer
partner. Unless such transfers occur, divergent policies may in fact be optimal from an equity
standpoint where countries are diverse.  This relates,  in part, to the not entirely  implausible
assumption that environmental quality  is a superior good.
Another theoretical  case for continued  divergence of environmental  policies  in the
local effects situation  links back to physical geographic  (but not socioeconomic,  as  in the
previous  argument)  diversity.  What  makes  sense  under  one  set  of conditions  may  be
impractical  or  otherwise  undesirable  under  another.  In  addition  the  initial  conditions
prevailing  in each country (or region) will generally not be the  same. Thus even given the
3 The treatment  of environmental  assimilative  capacity as an endowment  that provides a
source  of comparative  advantage  has  been  controversial.  One  the one  hand,  having  good  soil
conditions that can support intensive production  methods that could lead to soil erosion  or water
pollution elsewhere can be seen as similar to the presence of an ore body that provides a comparative
advantage in trade.  On the other hand, environmentalists  argue that no justification can  be given for
increased pollution in a region just because environmental  degradation  has not already taken place.
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same utility functions, the emphases of environmental policies will naturally differ. Bhagwati
and Srinivasian (1997)  analytically demonstrate that "different countries will have legitimate
diversity of...environmental taxes and standards.  This diversity will arise  even if they share
the same 'utility function'...: the diverse tax rates can come from differences  in technology
and in endowments in the broadest sense." (pp 167-8)  To take one example from agriculture,
it is common for different pesticides to be approved for use in different countries. Indeed, it
makes little sense to go through the regulatory process to approve pesticides effective against
pests which  are not present  in a country,  or for application  to  crops which are  not grown
there.  Looking at the  problem  a little  differently, Bhagwati  (1996)  uses  the  example of
dysentery  in one  location making clean water a priority, vs.  a high priority placed on clean
air in a location not subject to immediate health risks from a contaminated water supply but
with air pollution problems.  This can be viewed  in the context of the difference  between
constrained  and  unconstrained optima:  in the absence  of a budget constraint,  the choices
might be the same or similar while in the presence of budget constraints there is a different
policy  choice  where  initial  conditions  and  endowments  are  diverse.  Also,  in  familiar
marginal terms, the marginal pollution abatement dollar will optimally be spent where it will
yield the greatest return (Bhagwati  and Srinivasian, 1997).
It is easy  to demonstrate that upward harmonization  of environmental policies does
not necessarily benefit the (previously) high standards country. Upward harmonization  can
in  fact lead  to lose-lose  outcomes  where the country  raising its standards  loses from the
movement  to  a less  optimal  set of constraints  and the  higher  standards  country loses  by
having to pay higher prices  for the products  imported from the trading partner. Think of a
restriction on effluent from food manufacturing operations  in country A, which has  a fairly
low absorptive capacity  for this type of pollutant. Before harmonization country A imports
manufactured  food products  from  country  B which does  not find  it socially  desirable  to
regulate  effluent  from  this  type  of manufacturing,  possibly  due  to  a  relatively  large
absorptive  capacity.  After (upward)  harmonization,  the  effluent restrictions  in country B
increase  operating costs without appreciably affecting environmental quality.  The increased
costs lead  in turn to an increase in product price for consumers  in both countries,  possibly
some shift in production from country B to country A, overall smaller combined production,
and little or no environmental benefit.  Gains may accrue to the manufacturers  of effluent-
restricting technology, but to few other groups in either country.
Empirical Studies
One characteristic  finding of theoretical  analyses of the problem of environmental
regulation in countries linked through trade  is that under many circumstances the outcomes
(trade,  social welfare, environmental)  are ambiguous  and are dependent  upon the relative
strength of positive and negative effects (Copeland and Taylor,  1995). The analysis presented
in  Table  1  illustrates  the  difficulty  of finding  definitive  theoretical  results.  Further,
harmonization  across heterogenous  countries  or locations  is not typically  found to be the
optimal policy approach. Other  generalizations  which are worth considering  are:  1) it makes
a difference for social welfare outcomes whether  a country is "large"  or "small;" 2) importer
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vs.  exporter  status  affects  the  desirability  of environmental  regulation  from  a  welfare
standpoint; and 3) rich countries are likely to choose higher levels of environmental quality
than are poorer countries, ceteris paribus.
Probably the  most pertinent example  of harmonization  of environmental  policies
across  countries  is  to be  found  in  the  EU  set  of environmental  Directives.  These  were
developed  as a part of the deepening of the economic  and political integration process.  One
Directive that has been relatively well studied for agriculture  is the Nitrate Directive, which
was passed in 1991  (Leuck, et al.,  1995). The Directive sets forth timetables, some processes
and standards,  and has an 8 year phase-in period. It also allows for variability of application
within  a country  (mandatory  compliance  in designated  "vulnerable  zones"  and voluntary
compliance elsewhere)  and  for individual  countries to  have  stricter standards  than  those
established under the Directive. Leuck, et al. (1995)  found that implementation is likely to
both  alter the  distribution  of livestock  production  within  the  EU  and  to  mildly  reduce
aggregate  EU livestock production.  Social welfare assessments were not reported.
Little  empirical  support  beyond  anecdotal  evidence  has  been  found  for  the
theoretically supportable argument that  (differential)  environmental regulations  reduce  or
enhance  international competitiveness  (von Moltke,  1993, Jaffee, et al.,  1993). Nor is there
conclusive  evidence  that  differences  in  environmental  policies  across  countries  play  a
meaningful  role  in  industrial  migration  decisions  or otherwise  systematically  affects  the
location of production for environmentally  intensive  goods, where one would most expect
to see the effects (Low,  1993, Tobey,  1993,  and Jaffee  et al.,  1993).  In general,  these results
are attributable to the relatively  low share of environmental compliance costs in total costs
of production.
If, as  it appears,  that environmental  policy  differences  do not necessarily  lead to a
redistribution of competitive  advantage and may or may not lead to meaningful alterations
in the location of production, the desirability of policy harmonization from a social welfare
standpoint  should  be carefully  assessed  for the  agricultural  and  agri-food  sectors within
North America.
4 The problem, of course, is that the specificity regarding subsectoral markets,
policies and environmental effects which is necessary  for even a crude assessment of social
welfare  outcomes  is not compatible  with the kinds  of assumptions which  are necessarily
made  in order to construct and solve (computable)  general  equilibrium models.  At the same
time,  failure  to consider the  trade-offs  across  subsectors  can lead  to poor policy choices
and/or  difficult negotiations.  Stated differently,  it is neither  enough  to know merely that
"country  A gains at country B's expense"  on a macro level  nor that "producers  of X gain at
the expense of consumers, taxpayers  and the environment,"  as these conclusions  may well
be  reversed in a different market or location.  As Bhagwati  (1996)  points out, the absolute
and comparative  advantage effects of environmental  policies may not be the  same, an effect
which  argues  against  making  easy  generalizations  of competitive  and  welfare  effects.
Quantitative  and theoretical  modeling exercises  at the  economy-wide,  sector-specific  and
location-specific level each have a contribution to make to the policy dialog, without any one
4 This question  has relevance  for those production  processes  having  local,  as opposed  to
global or cross-border, environmental  implications.
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approach being capable of  providing a definitive answer regarding the desirability of policy
harmonization.
We turn now to an overview of the environmental  provisions in the NAFTA and in
other  relevant  arenas  to  provide  some of the  institutional  context  for this discussion  of
harmonization/convergence/compatibility  of environmental policies.  This is followed by a
closer look at an individual agri-food  subsector.
ENVIRONMENTAL  PROVISIONS  IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
Formal co-operation on North American environmental issues predates the FTA and
NAFTA.  Previous treaties and agreements  have generally  focused on management of joint
resources  such as the Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada (1909)
and the United  States  and  Mexico  (1944).  Similarly,  disputes  regarding  environmental
pollution between the NAFTA countries  are not new and  have concerned  border regions.
Although previous disputes have not focused on agriculture,  future environmental conflicts
involving the sector  are  likely,  e.g.,  along the U.S.-Mexico  border where  agriculture  is a
major  user of increasingly  scarce water,  and where  fertilizers  and pesticides  in irrigation
drainage contribute  to water pollution (CEC,  1996a).
NAFTA  Institutional Arrangements
NAFTA is the first trade agreement to explicitly address concerns about the linkages
between  environmental  regulations  and  competitiveness  and  to  raise  the  issue  of
harmonization.  Four aspects of the NAFTA and the environmental side agreement, the North
American  Agreement  on  Environmental  Cooperation  (NAAEC)  affect  the  conduct  of
members and relate to harmonization.  First, a number of principles are set out.  Importantly,
each country  retains sovereignty  over domestic  environmental policy and has the right to
maintain  its own environmental  standards.  Countries also have the right to participate  in
international  environmental agreements  and provisions of those agreements take precedence
over those in the NAFTA.  Countries  can change their regulations  as long as modifications
do  not  result  in  less  protection  of  the  environment,  and  the  agreement  encourages
harmonization through raising environmental  regulations to the highest existing level among
the member countries.  Environmental policies cannot create a barrier to trade.  Only the later
statement,  against using environmental regulations as disguised trade barriers, is enforceable.
The contrast between having recourse to a dispute settlement process when regulations create
a trade barrier on the one hand, and unenforceable principles for high levels of environmental
protection on the other, stems from the reality that the NAFTA, including the NAAEC, was
negotiated as a trade agreement  and not as an environmental  treaty.
Second, each party  is obligated  to enforce  its own environmental  laws, to monitor
compliance and environmental  outcomes,  and to make this information publicly available.
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The NAAEC provides  the authority to impose sanctions when a country does not enforce its
own  laws.  The process  to  apply for sanctions  is similar  to the  panel process  for dispute
settlements  under  the  NAFTA. 5 The  differences  are  that  private  citizens  and  Non
Governmental  Organizations (NGOs) can initiate complaints and a request  for a panel must
be  approved by two-thirds of the countries or as a practical matter both of the countries not
cited  in the  complaint.  Penalties  include  fines or having a  country  suspend  its NAFTA
provisions  for certain  goods  from the  country  found to  be persistently  violating its own
environmental  laws.  Johnson  and  Beaulieu  (1996)  point  out  the  irony  that  having  no
environmental protection or actively enforcing low levels of protection would meet NAFTA
obligations  while partial  enforcement  of high standards  potentially  subjects  a country  to
sanctions.
Third, the NAAEC established the North American  Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC),  a tri-lateral  regulatory  agency  having  monitoring,  enforcement,  and
dispute settlement powers.  The CEC manages the process to impose sanctions for failure to
enforce  environmental  regulations.  The  CEC  also  has  a  mandate  to  provide  input  into
NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement panels that touch'on environmental issues.6 As part
of a  Chapter  20  dispute,  the  CEC  may  create  working  groups  of  experts  and  make
recommendations  to solve the dispute.  The provisions, written after NAFTA was negotiated,
were designed to complement  its dispute settlement process.  The CEC is also charged with
evaluating  the  environmental  consequences  of NAFTA  implementation  and reporting  on
actions taken by each country related to the environmental  agreement.
Fourth, the NAFTA agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and standards-
related measures  addresses  environmental  issues in agriculture.  These technical  measures
are discussed  in the paper by Bredahl and Holleran  in this volume.  Of note for the  current
discussion  is that the measures  are also based on the principle of national  sovereignty,  and
countries have the right to set their own standards subject to restrictions to prevent them from
being used as disguised trade barriers.  The sanitary  and phytosanitary  measures recognize
that,  for environmental  issues,  national boundaries  may not set the  relevant borders.  For
example,  in establishing  restrictions  on live animal trade because  of disease, the NAFTA
makes  regions and not countries the relevant  geographical  area.
Dispute Cases  with Environmental Implications  As of May  1997, NGOs or private citizens
had  filed  nine  complaints  with  the  CEC  about  failure  to  enforce  environmental  laws.
5 Special provisions  for  the applications  of sanctions  against Canada  are  included  in the
NAAEC because  the Federal  and Provincial governments  share responsibility  for environmental
regulation and  dispute responsibility  in  some areas.  Briefly,  if Canada  fails  to comply  with  a
decision a  court case must be filed  in the relevant  Canadian jurisdiction.
6  NAFTA  contains several  dispute settlement processes.  Chapter  20 covers  disputes not
related to unfair  trade practices  and is intended to cover most environment  related cases.  Chapter
19 sets rules for Binational Panels arbitrating  domestic countervailing duty and anti-dumping  cases.
However, unlike Chapter 20, the NAAEC does not establish a process to provide input into Chapter
19 cases.
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Although the small number makes generalizations  risky, the fact that seven of the nine cases
involve  the  United  States  or  Canada  suggests  that  more  stringent  environmental  laws,
perhaps combined with better information about environmental  conditions and compliance,
give rise to complaints.  Also, there is some indication that the NAFTA process is being used
as a tool in contentious domestic environmental  disputes. CEC complaints are a new way  for
organized environmental groups to attempt to force compliance with a country's laws outside
of the established domestic channels.
The three cases against the United State claim that the government failed to enforce
the Endangered  Species  Act,  did not satisfy laws  regarding timber disposal,  and did not
conduct a proper environmental review prior to expanding a military base.  The two cases
concerning Mexico  relate to an environmental  impact report  about expansion of a port and
pollution of the  Magdalena  River.  One  of the  four cases filed  against  Canada  concerns
enforcement  of pollution  laws in Quebec  for agriculture,  primarily the hog industry.  The
three other Canadian cases have possible implications for agriculture.  A complaint filed by
an environmental  group  claims  that the  government  did not  follow  laws  to evaluate the
environmental  impact  of  the  Old  Man  River  dam  which  has  been  a  contentious
environmental  issue.  When completed  this dam will provide water for irrigation.  Another
complaint was filed by a private  citizen who claimed  that water pollution  laws have been
violated resulting in pollution of a lake in Alberta.  This complaint states that, "The anaerobic
polluted water may come from any  of a variety of sources: agricultural  wastes, oil and gas
production and processing, sewage and waste treatment,  landfills and so forth.  Some of these
activities  are  poorly  regulated  by  the  Alberta  Government  and  some  are  essentially
unregulated (such  as agricultural wastes, since agriculture  and agricultural  processing are
exempt from the Alberta Environmental  Protection  and Enhancement Act)."  (CEC,  1997)
The complaint met the criteria for official review, but was not heard because of an ongoing
court case in Alberta  on the same matter. The fourth  case involves protection of fisheries in
British Columbia.
Formal  disputes  based  on  technical  regulations  related  to  the  environment  and
agriculture  have  already  been  heard  under NAFTA.  These  disputes  focus  on  whether
regulations to protect the environment of a country create barriers to trade.  One potential
case involves  U.S. Food and  Drug Agency  (FDA) regulations  requiring zero tolerance  for
salmonella in poultry which could adversely affect exports  of Canadian  game birds (CEC,
1996a).  It remains  to be  seen  what  kinds of evidence  are  accepted  in  this  context  as
convincing  justification  that  an  action  represents  legitimate  protection  rather  than
protectionism,  or vice versa.
NAFTA  and GATT/WTO Provisions
The NAFTA and the GATT both focus on preventing environmental regulations  from
acting  as  unnecessary  trade  barriers  and  the  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  and  standards
provisions of the NAFTA are modeled after those in the GATT.  Members of the NAFTA
can also bring disputes on trade policies with environmental  implications to the World Trade
Organization  (WTO).  Notwithstanding  the  similarities,  the  NAFTA  contains  broader
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coverage on environmental policy than do the provisions under the GATT agreement.  The
GATT does not contain any provisions regarding enforcement of domestic  environmental
regulation  or mechanisms  for citizen complaints.  The GATT does not allow trade barriers
based  on  production  processes,  as  exemplified  by  the  tuna-dolphin  case.  The  NAFTA
contains a statement of principle that regulations on process are relevant, but this has not yet
been tested through a formal dispute.
NAFTA  vs. European Union
In contrast to the NAFTA, the European  Union (EU) contains deeper harmonization
of environmental  regulations.  This  reflects  both general  EU economic  integration  and an
explicit statement by EU members that environmental protection is a fundamental value. The
EU  has  made  an explicit  choice  to deepen  the integration  of the member  countries  and
agreements  have been reached regarding  overall objectives,  but timing and many specifics
are  allowed to vary among countries.  The exception  is minimum standards (though they may
be  achieved differently)  and those elements which would serve to impede trade within the
EU.  Key to the success within the EU of such harmonization measures  is that the Directives
require  each country's government to enact  statutes to implement the EU-wide policies. No
such authority is contained within the NAFTA provisions.
As mentioned above, the EU has enacted a set of environmental  Directives that cover
cases, like nitrates, where there are direct spillover effects outside of the originating  country
and cases, like the package recycling and recyclability Directive, where the non-local  effects
are  less direct but have direct trade implications.  In both cases, there is significant  scope for
higher  than  minimum  standards  on  a  country-by-country  basis  and  some  flexibility  in
implementation.  Other aspects are  less flexible.  For example,  in order for food and  other
products  to  be  sold  within  the  EU,  their  packaging  will  have  to  meet  the
recycling/recyclability  requirements  regardless of country of origin (Latriche and Lindsey,
1994).  Here, compatibility of regulations is a meaningful  trade issue and the Directive was
designed to foster the free flow of  products  across borders while maintaining a certain level
of environmental  protection.  Lower  income countries within the EU are allowed a longer
phase-in  period.  The  Nitrate  Directive  also  includes  a  phase-in  period,  but  makes  its
distinctions among local  areas (which do not necessarily correspond to national boundaries)
in which nitrate pollution  is a problem.  Here the differences have to do with mandatory  vs.
voluntary compliance.
Contrast the above situation with that of the NAFTA,  where economic  and political
integration  is not a goal of the member countries. For technical  regulations, harmonization
or mutual recognition of certain  standards  or practices  could make  implementation  more
straightforward  and improve the free flow of goods and services (e.g., the EU-wide  symbols
regarding  the  recyclability  of packaging  and  the  presence  of recycled  materials).  Such
harmonization/compatibility  could also contribute to freer trade. Yet, the absence of authority
under the NAFTA to  compel subnational  governing  units within each member country to
recognize mutually agreed symbols or practices is problematic for this type of harmonization,
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and even at the national level the Canadian-U.S.  working groups set up under the FTA are
instructive regarding the difficulty of this task.
LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY  EXAMPLE
Environmental  regulations  in the  livestock  industry  provide  an illustration  of the
implications  of  harmonization  of  environmental  regulations  for  competitiveness  and
environmental  quality. Three main points from the general discussion are examined.  First,
examples of environmental policies are given to show the differences between harmonization
of environmental  effects and  regulatory  burden.  Second,  policy regimes  in the NAFTA
countries  are discussed showing the substantive differences in regulations that occurs both
within and across countries.  Last, costs of compliance with environmental  regulations  for
the livestock  industry are low.
Two  Types  Of  Harmonization  For  Livestock  Waste  Management  Environmental
Policies
The  livestock  industry  is a  major  agricultural  contributor  to pollution.  Negative
externalities  from the livestock  industry potentially  occur at all  stages of production and
processing. At the primary production level,  externalities result from animal waste products,
animal  disposal,  and  animal  welfare.  Pollution  from  processing  is  tied  to  wastewater
disposal and worker health and safety.  Our analysis focuses on regulation of water pollution
from waste  management.  Externalities  from the  livestock  waste  can create  a number of
serious  problems  such  as  pollution  of groundwater  by  nitrate  emissions  (from  excess
nitrogen),  eutrophication  of  surface  waters  by  phosphate  emissions,  acidification  by
ammonium emissions,  contamination by heavy metals such as cadmium, copper,  mercury,
lead and zinc originating  from concentrated  feedstuffs, contamination by pathogenic micro-
organisms,  and odour problems.  Pollution from nitrogen  has received the most  attention
since it affects human and animal  health. Infants under six months of age are susceptible to
a potentially lethal blood disorder called methaemoglobinaemia,  caused by large amounts of
nitrates  in drinking water. Links  between excessive  nitrate levels and stomach cancer  are
more controversial.  Phosphorus is the other major environmental indicator because  it is the
limiting nutrient in euthrophication of surface water.
Several policies for livestock waste management regulate the environmental outcome
rather  than  the production  process.7 Harmonization,  should  it  take place,  would  be  of
environmental  quality rather than of cost equalization.  An example  of this type of policy is
7 Livestock  waste  management produces both  point and nonpoint  source pollution.  Our
objective  is to analyze existing regulations in terms of harmonization  and not optimal regulations.
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mandating  that  farmers  dispose  of  manure  in  a  way  that  does  not  cause  nitrogen  or
phosphorus  to end up in surface or ground water.  For example, in order to spread  manure,
a farmer must show that land planted to a specific  crop could absorb the amount of nutrients
present  in the manure.  The regulations  establishing manure management plans also restrict
harmful practices  such as spreading  manure during high rainfall periods or close to surface
water.  In  some jurisdictions,  farmers  must  document  their  actions  by  filing  manure
management plans.x
The cost of complying  with manure management plans varies as  a function of each
farmer's  specific  soil conditions,  amount  of rainfall,  and proximity to surface water.  For
example, the British Columbia Code of Agricultural Practices  legislates that manure disposal
must not exceed an amount such that the soil  can absorb the nutrients. The long rainy season
represents the largest constraint to spreading and most farmers have had approximately three
months manure storage capacity, which is less than that implied by the regulations.  In British
Columbia,  construction  of additional  storage  for  a  100  cow  dairy  herd  costs  between
C$12,000  for  a  clay  pit  in  favorable  soil  conditions  to  C$120,000  for a  concrete  lined,
covered pit. Thus the costs differ according  to environmental conditions,  even with the same
regulations  in place.  Note that  these  same variables  affect  the  amount of the  externality
associated with production of a unit of manure.
Another example of  a policy  in the spirit of harmonization  of environmental outcomes
is  special  standards  for regions  that are  environmentally  sensitive.  For example,  coastal
zones  in  the  United  States  will  face  stricter  management  standards  for  the  livestock
(including poultry) industry than elsewhere.  This policy  is expected to lead to higher costs
for coastal livestock  and poultry producers.
Other policies for waste management require  farmers to satisfy common production
practice standards  and, if there was harmonization.  would lead to equalization  in the costs
of compliance.  These policies result in variation  in environmental  outcomes.  Examples of
such policies are minimum acreage per animal unit and specific requirements detailing waste
handling facilities.  For example,  in Quebec  regulations require  farmers to have a minimum
land area per hog.  The cost of compliance  can differ according to land values, but variation
across  farmers  should  be  less  than  with  regulations  that  mandate  equal  environmental
outcomes.  However,  the amount of pollution will vary  depending on the absorptive capacity
of the soil (Savard et al.,  1996)  and both the timing and amount of rainfall.
Regulations  in NAFTA  Countries
Under any plausible  criteria  for harmonization,  existing  environmental regulations
paint a clear picture  of diversity both within and across national boundaries.  In addition to
8 In practice,  while the goal of manure management plans is to prevent excess nutrients from
entering surface  or  groundwater,  differences  in how the regulations  are  implemented  exist.  For
example, some regions  (e.g.. North Carolina) only  regulate nitrogen while other regions (e.g.,  Ohio)
have guidelines  for both nitrogen and phosphorus.
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national environmental  regulations, all three NAFTA countries empower local governments
with the  ability to  establish  and enforce  environmental  regulations.  The  devolution  of
regulatory power within each country suggests the irrationality of  trying to impose a common
set of standards  across the three NAFTA  countries, particularly  in  view of their extreme
diversity  in  environmental  conditions.  Given  the  acceptance  of  differences  in  local
regulations,  it would be difficult to then argue for harmonization across national boundaries
by any of the member countries.
Canadian Regulations  While both  federal  and provincial  governments  in Canada  have
ministries with responsibility  for protection of the environment,  provincial environmental
laws  play  the  most  important  role  including  those  laws  affecting  agriculture.  Local
governments  have authority  over environmental  regulation  related  to agriculture  through
powers to regulate air, water, and noise pollution as well as the power to protect sensitive
areas.  Local  governments  have  been  increasingly  active  in  establishing  and  enforcing
regulations  (CEC,  1995).  Water  quality  regulations  illustrate  the  nature  of  shared
responsibility  for the environment in Canada.  Federal laws establish regulations  to protect
surface  water quality.  Under  separate  legislation,  the federal  "Fisheries  Act"  prohibits
discharging substances into water that can harm fish and has been used to control agricultural
pollution.  Groundwater  is  regulated  at  the  provincial  level  and  both  provinces  and
municipalities  regulate the quality of drinking water.
For waste  management,  the types of policies  vary across  provinces.  As discussed
previously, Quebec has regulations on animal units per hectare.  Both British Columbia and
Ontario have regulations  on manure  management that focus on  environmental  objectives
rather  than  specific practices.  Education  of farmers  has been  an objective  in both these
provinces.  For  example,  Ontario  has  Environmental  Farm  Plans  with  an  educational
objective to identify concerns  and introduce changes in farm management (CEC,  1996b).
U.S.  Regulations  A large number of federal government agencies have responsibility  for
environmental  regulations.  Every state also has agencies with the power to set standards,
implement,  and administer  laws,  develop  education  programs,  and monitor  compliance.
Several  state  agencies  have  been  delegated  authority  to  administer  federal  programs
including the Clean Water Act which contains provisions relating to agricultural nonpoint
discharges.
The Clean Water Act in the United States directs states to identify and remedy water
quality problems  such as those caused by manure. Differences  in policies  across states and
local municipalities exist. In addition to regulations constraining farmer behavior, some state
governments  provide  subsidies  for  investments  to  meet  regulations  (e.g.,  an  improved
manure storage facility).  Evidence exists of substantial differences in subsidies among states
(Trebilcock and Howse, p. 125).  There is also national-level  regulation by the Environmental
Protection Agency of animal feedlot operations large enough to meet the criterion for point
as opposed to nonpoint source pollution, while smaller operations  are exempt.
Mexican Regulations  The authority to protect the environment is embedded in the Mexican
constitution  and  this  power  has  been  expanded  over  time  and  now  encompasses  the
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preservation and restoration  of ecological  equilibrium  and specifically  includes  pollution
prevention.9 NAFTA  provisions  for  disclosure  appear  to  expand  the  public's  right to
information  about pollution  discharges.  Regulation  of water quality  is  governed  by  the
National  Water Law which gives the National Water Commission (part of the Secretariat  of
Environment,  Natural  Resources,  and  Fisheries)  responsibility  to  protect  surface  and
groundwater and include land use as a factor determining water quality.
While  in general  the federal  government  plays the  dominant role in environmental
regulation, states have authority over establishing and ensuring compliance of water pollution
regulation.  There is an overall trend in Mexico towards increasing the role of state and local
governments  in the formulation  and enforcement of environmental regulations.  Therefore,
local regulations are likely to play a large role in livestock waste management if projections
for expansion of intensive feeding operations prove accurate. The government provides some
subsidies for pollution control, but they are directed towards air pollution.
Compliance Costs  for Regulations
Many North American  livestock markets  are highly integrated,  especially  between
Canada and the  United  States (e.g.,  beef and pork). The strong  linkages between national
markets  mean  that  differences  in  environmental  regulations  potentially  affect
competitiveness.  However,  to date environmental  regulations have not been the source of
trade disputes. The relatively small cost of regulations to producers for the livestock sector
doubtless contributes to the ability to live with policy diversity thus  far. Cost estimates  for
the United  States serve  to illustrate this point.
While no  single measure  is ideal, estimates  of regulatory  costs  in the United States
calculated  in different ways each yield modest values on a percentage  basis. The Bureau of
Economic Analysis estimates the costs of pollution abatement for feedlot operations in  1990
equal  to $12 million.  Combined with USDA  data for livestock  on feed (cattle,  sheep and
lambs and hogs/pigs), this works out to 0.2 percent of the value of  the animals.  Ingo Walter's
input-output  based  calculations  using  data  for  1968  to  1970  found  direct  and  overall
environmental  control  "loadings"  for livestock  and products  entering  international  trade
flows  to  be  1.28  percent  direct,  and  1.98  percent overall  (percent of final  sales).  More
recently Jaffe,  et al.  estimated that the  1991  gross annual pollution abatement  and control
costs as a percent of value of shipments for all industries was 0.62 percent, those with "High"
abatement  costs include  paper and allied products  with 1.27  percent, chemical  and allied
products with 1.38 percent, petroleum and coal with  1.8 percent and primary metal with  1.51
percent.  Jaffee, et al.'s estimates  are consistently below Walter's.
This said, costs for individual producers can be expected to differ substantially  from
any overall  averages,  and differential costs faced by similar producers in partner countries
could make a difference  at the margin.  Yet, when viewed  in the context of other relevant
9The CEC report, "Status of Pollution Prevention in North America"  contains a description
of the evolution of Mexican environmental  law.
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production cost and policy variability across regions and countries, the case for concern over
competitive  advantage  or disadvantage  due  to  diverse  environmental  regulations  is  not
compelling.
CONCLUSIONS
Tremendous diversity exists in the types of environmental policies within each of the
NAFTA  countries.  This diversity  is  largely consistent  with  efficient  economic  policies
because  of the wide range of environmental  conditions  in Canada,  the United States, and
Mexico  and  possible differences  in demand  for environmental  quality. All three NAFTA
countries  foster  diversity  in  regulations  within  their  own  borders  by  providing  local
governments  with jurisdiction  over some types of environmental  quality,  including  water
quality. This is very different from national agricultural  policy programs that are familiar to
stakeholders within agriculture.
The NAFTA  and  its environmental  side  agreement  (NAAEC)  respect  domestic
sovereignty over environmental policy as long as the policies do not create  trade barriers.
Against this background permitting differences  in environmental policies  is a statement of
principle that countries  should not lower environmental  standards and should pursue upward
harmonization of policies.  However, no details are provided as to the type of harmonization
envisioned.
While  a citizen  complaint  has  been filed  under NAFTA  about  failure  to enforce
environmental  laws affecting the pork sector,  differences in environmental regulations have
not yet led  to trade disputes  for agriculture,  and  this could continue  in the long run.  One
plausible  reason for the lack of disputes  is that,  for all  but a  few industries,  the costs of
environmental  regulation are relatively  small. Agriculture is not an exception to this general
statement.  In addition,  the diversity  in regulations  within  Canada,  the United  States,  and
Mexico,  would  make  it  difficult  to argue that  differences  in  regulations  across  country
boundaries provide a justification for a countervailing duty. Finally, there is no evidence to
date  of a  'race to  the  bottom'  to lower  environmental  standards  in  an attempt  to cause
production to relocate.
When trade disputes do occur, the nature of environmental  policies  calls for region-
specific  solutions. Because  of the specificity of problems and solutions, it is important to
make  use  of subsector-  and  geographic-specific  information  when  evaluating  sectoral
environmental  policies.  This  is  likely  to be  a  troublesome  issue for  any disputes  over
technical regulations relating to environmental  problems.
However, there are some areas where harmonization or policy coordination could lead
to more efficient outcomes.  The experience of the EU provides lessons about where to push
for  harmonization  of  domestic  policies  within  the  economic  integration  process.  The
recycling example stands out in this context as one in which harmonization  facilitates trade
and  is  compatible  across  countries.  Clearly  environmental  problems  located  in border
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regions  also require policy coordination, but all three NAFTA countries have been working
together  in this area  for many years, and this process is already facilitated by the NAFTA.
Future research  that provides  information  on the  market and  nonmarket  effects  of
existing policies would help manage and evaluate the environmental policy diversity that will
exist  in the long run.  There is also a need for additional  information specific to agriculture
on the types of  policies that exist and their environmental impacts.  Ideally this would include
detailed  studies  on  sectors  where  producers  have  expressed  concerns  about  costs  of
compliance  with environmental  regulation  and its  competitive consequences.
Overall, the case for harmonization  of  environmental policies pertaining to agriculture
within North America  is not strong, and  the diverse conditions  and specificity  of optimal
policy  responses  together  with  devolution  of  regulatory  authority  within  the  NAFTA
countries suggests that convergence  is neither likely nor socially optimal for environmental
problems having no  direct cross-border effects.
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